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Abstract
Corporate governance in Germany is often described as a bank-oriented, block-
holder or stakeholder model where markets for corporate control have not
played a significant role. This case study of the hostile takeover of Mannesmann
AG by Vodafone in 2000 demonstrates how systemic changes during the 1990s
have eroded past institutional barriers to takeovers. These changes include the
strategic reorientation of German banks from the “house bank” to investment
banking, the growing consensus and productivity orientation of employee co-
determination and corporate law reform. A significant segment of German cor-
porations are now subjected to a market for corporate control. The implications
for the German model are examined in light of both claims by agency theory for
the efficiency of takeover markets, as well as the institutional complementarities
within Germany’s specific “variety” of capitalism. While the efficiency effects are
questionable, the growing pressures for German corporations to achieve the
higher stock market valuations of their Anglo-American competitors threaten the
distributional compromises underlying the German model.
Zusammenfassung
In der Vergangenheit wurde die Abwesenheit feindlicher Übernahmen als typisch
für das deutsche Modell der Unternehmenskontrolle angesehen. Anhand einer
Fallstudie zur feindlichen Übernahme der Mannesmann AG durch Vodafone in
2000 wird in diesem Papier argumentiert, dass institutionelle Barrieren gegen
feindliche Übernahmen im Laufe der 1990er Jahre so weit erodiert sind, dass in
Deutschland ein Markt für Unternehmenskontrolle entsteht. Dazu zählen insbe-
sondere die Umorientierung der Großbanken vom Hausbank- zum Investment-
bankparadigma, die fortschreitende Konsens- und Produktivitätsorientierung
der Mitbestimmung und Veränderungen des deutschen Aktienrechts. Die
Gruppe der Großunternehmen mit gestreuter Aktionärsstruktur sieht sich dem
Zugriff des Markts für Unternehmenskontrolle nunmehr ausgesetzt. Die These
der Principal-Agent-Theorie, der zufolge feindlichen Übernahmemärkten Effi-
zienzwirkungen zuzuschreiben sind, wird kritisch bewertet. Die Gefahr feindli-
cher Übernahmen wird zu weiteren Anstrengungen zur Steigerung der Aktien-
kurse führen. Damit könnten die Verteilungskompromisse, die dem deutschen
Modell zu Grunde liegen, unter Druck geraten.
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1 Introduction: German Corporate Governance in Comparative Context1
National corporate governance regimes differ along a variety of dimensions:
ownership, finance, corporate law, boardroom practices, management pay, and
the role of employees. One of the most important and controversial differences
relates to markets for corporate control. In countries such as Britain or the United
States, markets for corporate control are thought to perform important govern-
ance functions in promoting a greater shareholder orientation among corporate
management. By contrast, Germany is often described as having a bank-oriented,
blockholder, or stakeholder model. Markets for corporate control have not played
a significant role in the post-war period. However, since the late 1990s, German
corporate governance has undergone sweeping changes, such as the growth of
foreign institutional investors and corporate governance reform aimed at facili-
tating greater shareholder and capital market orientation in large companies
(Höpner 2001a; Jackson 2002). In addition, several hostile takeover battles oc-
curred at Hoesch, Thyssen, and Continental.
This paper presents a case study of one unprecedented event, the successful hos-
tile takeover of Mannesmann by Vodafone between November 1999 and Febru-
ary 2000, and examines its significance within German corporate governance. The
takeover was one of the largest merger and acquisition (M&A) deals in the world,
worth nearly DM 390 billion, and reflects the growing power of stock market
capitalization in leveraging the takeover of the industrial giant Mannesmann
(30,000 employees, DM 40 billion in turnover, 109 years old) by a newer and
smaller rival Vodafone (12,600 employees, DM 11 billion in turnover, only
15 years old).2 The paper argues that the case of Mannesmann illustrates a para-
digmatic change in German corporate governance.
The Mannesmann takeover reflects the erosion of previous barriers to hostile
takeovers due to both regulatory reforms and incremental changes in the social
organization of capital markets. A small but growing segment of large German
corporations is now vulnerable to takeover threats. Consequently, the character-
istic governance coalitions within German corporations are changing to reflect the
new interests and mechanisms of influence for capital, labor, and management.
                                                  
1 The authors would like to thank Jürgen Beyer, Ronald Dore, Werner Eichhorst, and
Anke Hassel for their comments on a previous draft; we are also grateful to those
attending the 14th International Conference for the Society of the Advancement of
Socio-Economics (SASE), July 2000, London School of Economics. Any errors are our
own.
2 At the final shareholders’ meeting of August 22, 2001, the company name Mannes-
mann was officially replaced by the name Vodafone.
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Growing institutional tensions are arising between the distributive and strategic
constraints created by takeover markets, thereby furthering functional changes in
the institution of employee codetermination.
The significance of these changes should be interpreted in the context of the ex-
isting German “model” of corporate governance. Three features are particularly
relevant here (Jackson 2001). First, capital exhibits a strong financial commitment to
particular enterprises, reflected in stable ownership, a strong role for banks, and
the absence of a market for corporate control. German corporate ownership is, on
average, more concentrated than in Britain or the United States. The largest own-
ers are usually non-financial corporations and banks (Table 1). These groups of-
ten pursue strategic interests related to organizational strategy3 and long-term
relational incentives, since ownership strongly overlaps with a variety other
commercial relations (Beyer 1998). These factors make owners more long-term
oriented and bound to the welfare of the firm than is typical in liberal countries.
There, institutional investors retain a greater capacity to exit and pursue solely fi-
nancial returns on their shares. As will be discussed later, Anglo-American insti-
tutional investors have grown in importance in Germany since in the late 1990s.
                                                  
3 Different shareholder groups have different sorts of interests. On the distinction be-
tween financial and strategic interests in corporate ownership, see Jackson (2000).
Table 1 Ownership of Listed Corporations in Percent, 1990s
Germany United Kingdom United States
1991 1999 1991 1997 1990 1998
Banks 12.7 13.5 0.2 0.1 – –
Non-financial firms 39.4 29.3 3.3 1.2 – –
Government 2.6 1.0 1.3 0.1 0.0 0.0
Insurance firms 5.5 9.0 20.8 23.5 1.9 3.5
Pension funds – – 31.3 22.1 24.4 25.9
Investment firms & othera 4.8 13.6 10.4 12.5 15.8 22.3
Individuals 22.4 17.5 19.9 16.5 51.0 41.1
Foreign 12.7 16.0 12.8 24.0 6.9 7.2
a For the U.S., includes bank personal trusts, mutual funds, and other non-household investors.
Sources: DAI (2000); Bundesbank (2000); NYSE (2001). German data is estimated from heterogeneous
sources using both market and book values.
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Second, employees constitute an important force in corporate governance
through the legal institution of codetermination. Codetermination refers to the
rights of information, consultation, and codetermination in the decision-making
structure of companies through both works councils and the employee represen-
tation on the Supervisory Board of German companies.4 Third, German manage-
ment has to contend with voice from both capital and labor. The pluralistic nature
of corporate governance structure leads management to operate under a duality
principle of both long-term profit maximization and employee utility (Aoki 1988).
Germany’s post-war competitive success has often been attributed to the strength
of these arrangements in building long-term commitments between stakeholders.
The nonliberal features of the German model partially suspended market mecha-
nisms for both capital (markets for corporate control) and labor (long-term em-
ployment) and proved to have substantial institutional complementarities. Man-
agement was aided in building long-term organizational capacities by the parallel
commitment of capital to patient long-term investment and the high-trust work
organization. Thus corporate governance was a key institutional precondition for
the dynamic (X-) efficiency of the German production system in lower-volume,
high-quality product markets that require high skills (Streeck 1992). These
strengths mirrored many perceived deficits of liberal Anglo-American corporate
governance during the 1980s, such as short-termism, opportunism, and breaches
of trust with employees.
The absence of markets for corporate control can be viewed as a necessary condi-
tion for the historical development of the German model (Jackson 2001). Long-
term commitments to organization building may be undermined where capital
market pressures are too great or existing governance coalitions are broken up
through hostile takeovers. Thus an emerging takeover market raises a number of
particular challenges in Germany. Will a growing market for corporate control
erode the financial commitment of capital? What impact will takeovers have on
codetermination? And will the threat of hostile takeovers alter the orientation of
German management to long-term organizational building and consensus among
stakeholders?
In the remainder of the paper, Section 2 reviews the role of markets for corporate
control in light of economy theory and the U.S. experience. Section 3 looks at the
institutional features suppressing markets for corporate control in post-war Ger-
many and examines the recent wave of cross-border mergers and acquisitions.
Section 4 presents a detailed case study of the Mannesmann takeover, showing
                                                  
4 Works councils at plant level represent all workers. In contrast, codetermination also
includes the Supervisory Board, on which employee representatives have between a
third and half of the seats.
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how these factors were either absent or failed to have the hypothesized deterrent
effects. Section 5 concludes with the implications of the Mannesmann takeover
within the larger institutional context of German corporate governance.
2 The Market for Corporate Control
Capitalist economies are characterized by the exchange of commodities within
free markets. Yet markets are themselves embedded within social institutions that
define what “commodities” can be the object of free market exchange. Product
markets are often embedded within spatial boundaries (e.g., domestic free trade,
external tariffs) and restricted by regulation (e.g., televisions are traded relatively
freely, foods sometimes, electricity only recently, and plutonium never). Free la-
bor markets are the quintessence of industrial capitalism. Nonetheless, political
regulation and social insurance historically limited the risks associated with the
commodification of labor power. The free capital market also appears as a natural
feature of capitalist economies, but has often been limited to the boundaries of the
nation state. Markets for corporate control represent the historical development
of a distinct fourth type of market, wherein the trading of corporate equity occurs
on a very large scale and bestows the power to control these corporations (Win-
dolf 1994). In this context, corporations that combine capital and labor in the pro-
duction of commodities themselves become commodities.
The economic function of markets for corporate control is most clearly outlined
by agency theory. Agency theory addresses the question of how shareholders can
assure that once they invest their funds, management will act in their interests.
This question arose in the context of the pioneering study by Berle and Means
(1932) on the growing “separation from ownership and control” in U.S. corpora-
tions. They noted a decline in shareholder control over management as owner-
ship stakes grew smaller and more fragmented among a large number of indi-
viduals. Few incentives exist for fragmented owners to actively monitor man-
agement because the resources devoted to monitoring can be jointly appropriated
by the bulk of “free-riding” shareholders. Individuals therefore diversify their
portfolios and prefer exit over voice in response to poor performance. Moreover,
small shareholders are rarely informed enough to make qualified decisions or
monitor management in detail. In sum, corporate control undergoes a “market
failure” that needs to be remedied by several mechanisms to reduce agency costs:
legal protection of shareholders, incentive contracts for management, large
blockholders with the capacity and incentives to monitor management, or mar-
kets for corporate control (Shleifer/Vishny 1996).
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In his seminal article, Henry Manne (1965) first described the possible governance
function of a market for corporate control: “The lower the stock price, relative to
what it could be with more efficient management, the more attractive the take-
over becomes to those who believe that they can manage the company more effi-
ciently.” Manne’s theoretical innovation was to posit a strong relation between
share prices and managerial performance and thereby to discover a new market-
based governance mechanism compatible with the exit preferences of small
shareholders. As shareholders respond to poor managerial performance through
exit, the lower share prices create incentives for outsiders to accumulate control
rights, replace the management team, and restructure the underperforming firm.
These outsiders can recoup their investment through a share price premium.
Markets for corporate control can thus be defined in terms of transactions for
control over a company’s shares and occur through a variety of methods: open
market purchases, block purchases, tender offers, negotiated share swaps, or
contests over the control of proxy rights (Bittlingmayer 1998).
Many authors view markets for corporate control as an effective instrument for
disciplining poor management.5 Even the generalized threat of takeover places
management under greater discipline by institutionalizing a feedback mechanism
between corporate decision-making and the stock market. Takeover vulnerability
also increases the scope for shareholder voice, since shareholder exit leads to the
threat of a takeover. Management must seek to improve returns to capital and not
investment in “underperforming” assets, since managers risk their jobs if shares
underperform.
Much debate surrounds the merits and implications of markets for corporate
control. Management may react negatively to takeover threats by implementing
costly defensive strategies such as golden parachutes or poison pills and by
seeking legal protection from takeovers. Alternatively, management may respond
to capital market pressures by short-term strategies to bolster share prices,
thereby sacrificing beneficial long-term projects and investments. Finally, take-
overs may damage the position of other stakeholders and thus undermine trust
and cooperative relations. The widening influence of “the market” places issues
outside the bounds of negotiation by stakeholders, thereby turning management
decisions into de facto non-decisions: “a decision that results in the suppression or
thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the deci-
sion makers” (Bachrach/Baratz 1963).
                                                  
5 While large blockholders in Germany may be effective monitors, high ownership
concentration has other disadvantages: lack of capital liquidity, lack of risk diversifi-
cation, costs for small shareholders unable to share the private benefits of control ac-
cruing to large blockholders, etc.
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2.1 The U.S. Experience: Efficiency or Opportunism?
In assessing the impact of the market for corporate control, it is useful to review
empirical studies from the United States (Davis/Robbins 2001). During the 1960s,
U.S. companies pursued extensive unrelated corporate diversification through
mergers and acquisitions. The performance of the new conglomerate firms was,
on the whole, disappointing.6 Diversified firms became increasingly undervalued
by the stock market – the so-called “conglomerate discount.” In this context, the
Reagan administration loosened the antitrust regime to allow greater scope for
horizontal mergers compared with past interpretations of the Celler-Kefauver Act
of 1950 (Fligstein 1990). The Supreme Court also overturned many takeover re-
strictions found in state laws through the 1982 Edgar vs. MITE decision (457 U.S.
624). In addition, new innovations in financial markets increased the supply of
high-risk capital, most notoriously through the issue of “junk bonds” to corporate
raiders.
These factors contributed to an unprecedented wave of takeovers during the
1980s, resulting in the de-conglomeration of U.S. corporations (Davis et al. 1994).
Diversified firms were taken over at very high rates, split into component busi-
ness, and sold to acquiring firms within the same industry.7 Takeovers allowed
corporations to pursue strategic motives of consolidation, since acquiring compa-
nies could keep related parts of the target company but recoup a large share of
the purchase price through selling unrelated business to other buyers in those in-
dustries (Bhagat et al. 1990). Few target firms resumed diversification strategies,
and others began to proactively divest unrelated assets in order to focus on a core
competence. This takeover market has cooled considerably. Only 23 of the For-
tune 500 firms received tender offers between 1990 and 1996, and no more than
six takeovers were classified as hostile (Davis/Robbins 2001). Diversification no
longer impacted the likelihood of takeover, nor did poor performance. U.S. cor-
porate diversification continued to decline in the 1990s and consolidated the no-
tion of corporate focus.
Do takeover targets perform worse than comparable firms, and does their per-
formance improve after takeovers? A large body of literature empirically shows
the performance impact of takeovers to be rather weak and heavily dependent on
the country, time period, method, and criteria of performance. Some studies of
                                                  
6 The economic rationale of the conglomerate firm was related to its role in internaliz-
ing the allocation of capital and managerial expertise.
7 In a comprehensive survey of takeovers among Fortune 500 companies during the
1980s, Davis et al. (Davis/Diekmann/Tinsley 1994: 588) demonstrate that diversi-
fied conglomerates faced much higher risks of becoming takeover targets than non-
diversified firms.
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the United Kingdom and the United States fail to confirm that target firms have
poorer performance prior to takeover bids (Franks/Mayer 1995; Davis/Stout
1992). Regarding ex post performance, most studies agree that shareholders of
target firms gain large share price premium (Bittlingmayer 1998: 28). However,
the impact for shareholders of the acquiring firm are often negative.8 Post-
takeover company performance also remains mixed. For example, the risk of
hostile takeover had little impact on productivity in U.K. companies, but signifi-
cantly lowered levels of investment and raised dividends, consistent with popu-
lar views of short-termism (Nuttall 1999).
Critics argue that takeover “premiums” often result from redistribution rather
than productivity gains. Even Manne (1965) anticipated the enormous impact of
takeovers on the distribution of wealth: “Given the fact of special tax treatment
for capital gains, we can see how this mechanism for taking control of badly run
corporations is one of the most important ‘get-rich-quick’ opportunities in our
economy today.” First, the stock market may often value corporations below their
true market value (Kraakman 1988). A correct valuation of management strategy
is central to the effectiveness of a market for corporate control. However, capital
markets often take myopic, short-term views of investments, follow speculative
trends that make valuations very volatile, or fail to respond to bad management
because shareholders are uninformed. Second, takeovers are often motivated by
profit-seeking redistribution of stakeholder wealth that makes little positive con-
tribution to long-term company performance. The transfer of wealth from
stakeholders to shareholders accounts for a large proportion of takeover premi-
ums and leads to net losses of efficiency due to breaches of trust (Shleifer/Sum-
mers 1988; Chelma 1998). Employees face the dangers of assets being stripped
from the target company, employment being rationalized, and existing labor
agreements being renegotiated. Third, takeovers allow bidders to pursue mana-
gerial interests in the power, prestige, or higher salaries associated with larger
firm size. Just as markets for corporate control provide a potential means for dis-
ciplining management, active markets also increase the ability of management to
act opportunistically by acquiring companies using other people’s money. While
bust-up takeovers remain infrequent, speculative takeovers with purely financial
motives have been a theme from the earliest hostile bids by Jim Slater in the
United Kingdom during the 1950s to the junk bond excesses in the United States
during the 1980s.
                                                  
8 One German study finds no profitability effects for bidders’ shareholders, but reports
a roughly 9 percent premium for targets’ shareholders (Gerke et al. 1995).
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2.2 The Absence of Hostile Takeovers
Given the conflicting evidence on takeovers, what can be said about the absence of
takeover threats in Germany? De Jong (1996) argues that takeover threats subject
British firms to the “straight jacket” of the capital market: In order to generate
sufficient shareholder returns, firms are constrained from growing beyond a level
at which the marginal returns to equity diminish. Conversely, their absence al-
lows firms to retain the option of pursuing strategies other than maximizing re-
turn on equity (Ide 1998):
– firms can pursue higher market shares through strategies of forward-pricing;
– firms can spend more on capital investments and/or R&D;
– firms can absorb higher raw materials costs;
– firms can concentrate on market segments offering lower returns but having
large market size and relatively low risk;
– firms can absorb higher labor costs, thus avoiding layoffs more easily during
cyclical downturns and thereby protecting employee morale and firm-specific
human capital.
In German corporations, a higher share of value-added goes to employees and a
lower share to capital than in Britain (De Jong 1996). This distributional pattern
helped accommodate industrial citizenship as corporations specialized in strate-
gies of “diversified quality production” (Streeck 1992). Faced with the “beneficial
constraints” of high wages and employment rigidity (Streeck 1997), German firms
have strong incentives to invest in high skills and to target market niches that
utilize high-skill and high-productivity production. Conversely, the cooperative
institution of workplace codetermination is an asset in helping firms develop
large reserves of internal flexibility and employee support for incremental inno-
vations in products and processes (Boyer 2002). Such strategies are beneficial in
servicing lower growth markets or particularly in “catch-up” patterns of techno-
logical diffusion and improvement within established markets. Backed by capital
committed to long-term investment, industrial citizenship can function as a
“beneficial constraint” supporting flexible and high-skill internal labor markets.
The patient nature of capital markets has a strong institutional complementarity
with codetermination.
However, why do shareholders tolerate receiving less of the corporate pie in
Germany? The answer is that marginal returns to shareholders were actually
quite favorable and gave German investors little incentive to defect. The differ-
ence is that two “equilibria” exist giving the same rate of return to investors, but
having very different distributional and strategic consequences for corporations.
High share prices are sustained by high earnings, or low prices with low earn-
ings. This can be demonstrated by the following equation:
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(earnings/share price) * (dividends/earnings) = dividend yield
where
earnings = retained earnings + dividends = value added – depreciation – labor
– taxes – interest
These patterns are illustrated in Table 2 with reference to German and British
corporations. The first group of indicators shows that price–earnings ratios and
dividend yields are quite similar in both countries. Based on current profitability,
investors have little reason to exit in favor of the other country. However, the sec-
ond group of indicators shows that stock market valuations are lower in Ger-
many than in Britain, both in terms of absolute market capitalization and relative
to real assets. As a consequence, the third group of indicators shows that British
corporations sustain higher stock market valuations by generating higher earn-
ings. However, the German corporations have higher turnover and, importantly,
are able to sustain nearly double the number of employees.
German companies thus follow a “low level” equilibrium – low earnings and
dividends corresponding to lower share prices. Shareholders receive competitive
rates of return as long as market capitalization remains low, i.e., ownership re-
Table 2 Corporate Performance, Selected Averages 2000
Germany United Kingdom
Real returns to capital
Price-earnings ratio 17.8 21.5
Dividend yield 2.7% 2.6%
Return on equity 18.2% 20.4%
Market valuation
Market value (mill. euros) 20,754 42,337
Ratio of market value to turnover 0.51 2.14
Market value per employee (mill. euros) 0.14 0.97
Price-book ratio 2.5 4.6
Sales, profits, employment
Turnover (mill. euros) 38,122 22,015
Return on sales (EBIT to sales) 9.4% 19.2%
Employees 138,072 60,676
Source: Handelsblatt Europa 500, Handelsblatt June 11, 2001. Averages are calculated
from the 19 largest British and 20 largest German industrial firms belonging to the “Europa
500.” For computational purposes, negative values or price-earnings ratios exceeding 50
were dropped.
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mains concentrated among existing stable shareholders.9 By contrast, U.K. firms
have higher share prices, but require higher payments to investors to maintain
comparable returns to capital. Increasing market capitalization relative to the real
economy leads to declining rates of return and puts pressure on firms to generate
higher profits and distribute greater portions of their value-added to sharehold-
ers. Reversing the trend may be difficult. As market values rise relative to real
economic flows, firms cannot move back down to a lower equilibrium without
being punished.
The key point here is that the German “equilibrium” is not sustainable under an
open market for corporate control. First, the lower market to book values (price–
book ratio, PBR) make corporations more vulnerable by leaving more scope for
takeover premium through restructuring. Where PBR is less than 1, the book
value of assets exceeds the market value. Raiders would be rewarded by simply
busting up the company and selling the assets. Second, lower relative valuations
in the stock market make corporations vulnerable to takeover through share
swaps. Here, corporations with greater market valuations can use their shares as
a currency to give premiums to shareholders of the target firm. In either case, if
corporations lack protection against hostile bids, incentives exist for takeovers
aimed at restructuring operations.
3 The Role of Takeovers in Germany
Germany has traditionally had relatively low merger activity.10 During the 1970s,
an average of 373 mergers were reported to the Federal Cartel Office. This num-
ber increased to an annual average of 827 during the 1980s and to 1,653 between
1990 and 1998. A large wave of mergers with East German firms followed Ger-
man unification in the early 1990s, and the number of cross-border mergers in-
creased dramatically in the late 1990s due to the integration and liberalization of
European markets. The DM 51 billion value of M&A in 1991 increased threefold
to DM 152 in 1997 and to DM 442 in 1998 through the DaimlerChrysler merger
(Jakobs/Landgraf 1999). In the same period, worldwide M&A activity grew more
than fivefold from an estimated $ 379 billion to $ 2105 billion (Hulsa 1999). In-
cluding the Mannesmann deal worth some DM 388 billion, M&A International
                                                  
9 German stock market performance (index growth plus dividends) has been similar to
or outperformed U.S. performance in every postwar decade except the 1990s.
10 One study of Europe’s 1000 largest corporations between 1985 and 1991 ranked
Germany just eighth out of 11 European countries in terms of merger activity, having
just 87 percent of the average level compared with 137 percent of the average level in
Britain (Dietrich 1994).
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reported a record transaction value of DM 935 million and 1,972 transactions in
Germany during the year 2000 (Lückmann 2001).
What are the characteristics of German M&A? Given the density of intercorporate
networks and the high concentration of ownership, mergers are generally negoti-
ated on a friendly basis among large blockholders rather than occurring through
public tender offers, including hostile bids. These mergers are based less on finan-
cial or governance logic than they are on industrial logic: horizontal and vertical
mergers between firms in the same industry aim at rationalization and economies
of scale, while horizontal mergers diversify into new but related product areas
(Table 3). To some extent, German corporations also followed the global trend
toward conglomerate mergers involving unrelated diversification throughout the
1970s and 1980s. Compared to the U.S. levels in the post-conglomerate era, the
rate of highly diversified firms was higher in Germany (36 percent in 1994) than
in the United States (23 percent), but similar to the United Kingdom and Japan
(Lins/Servaes 1999). German corporations have also followed the United States
in de-institutionalizing the conglomerate form and focusing on core competen-
cies. Whereas 70 of the largest German companies were active in an average of 2.4
sectors (measured by two-digit NACE codes) in 1992/1993, their diversification
reduced some 9 percent to 2.2 sectors by 1996/1997.11 Listed companies declined
more dramatically, down some 22 percent from 3.3 sectors to 2.6 sectors in the
same period, which can be attributed to their exposure to a conglomerate dis-
count in the stock market (Zugehör 2001). Today, a growing share of mergers are
horizontal mergers with new related products.
                                                  
11 We are grateful to our colleague Rainer Zugehör for this calculation.
Table 3 Mergers by Type of Diversification
1973–1990 1991–1998
Horizontal 8,470
(68%)
11,468
(85%)
… without new products 6,331
(51%)
6,124
(46%)
… with new products 2,139
(17%)
5,362
(40%)
Vertical 1,698
(14%)
473
(4%)
Conglomerate 2,228
(18%)
1,470
(11%)
Total 12,396 13,429
Source: Das Bundeskartellamt, Tätigkeitsbericht, various years.
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3.1 Institutional Factors Suppressing a Market for Corporate Control
What are the reasons for the friendly nature of German M&A and the absence of
markets for corporate control (Schmidt 1997: 128–130; Baums 1993; Daum 1993)?
1. Ownership Structure. The number of potential takeover targets is quite small in
Germany due to the high level of ownership concentration. As Table 4 shows, 57
of the 100 largest firms12 were majority owned in 1998, an increase from the 53
majority-owned companies in 1978. Majority owners were divided among fami-
lies, foreign companies, and the state. Furthermore, only 71 of the 100 companies
had the legal form of joint-stock corporations, and only 51 were actively traded
on the stock exchange. No open market for shares exists for unlisted corporations
and private companies operated as GmbHs, since their sale requires the consent
of other owners. Even among listed corporations, large blockholders are still sig-
nificant. Taking the largest 49 listed firms, an average of 51.2 percent of all shares
were widely held and yielded the following distribution: 23 companies with over
50 percent fragmented holdings, 18 companies with between 25 percent and 50
percent of shares fragmented, and nine companies with less than 25 percent
fragmented holdings.13 Looking at fragmented ownership, only 23 of the largest
100 companies appear highly vulnerable to hostile takeover bids. Under the as-
sumption that one blockholder might be willing to sell, 41 companies might be
viewed as vulnerable to hostile attempts at control.
Despite the apparent stability of concentrated ownership over the last 20 years,
the decline in ownership concentration is likely to accelerate. A central factor fa-
cilitating the unwinding of intercorporate and bank holdings is the tax policy for
2002 (the so-called Eichel plan) that eliminates capital gains tax on the sale of cor-
porate shares (Höpner 2000b). Due the large discrepancy in reported book values
and actual market values of large blocks held over long periods of time, German
financial institutions have been reluctant to liquidate holdings because of the
large tax burden. However, the large stakes held by banks and insurance compa-
nies, as well as pyramidal holdings within German conglomerates, may now be
disposed of in two ways: through gradual sale on the stock market leading to
                                                  
12 The calculations in this section are based on data from the 100 largest firms by value-
added as of 1996, compiled in the MPI Enterprise Database.
13 A similar picture is confirmed by 1991 data on a broader sample of 558 listed compa-
nies (Jenkinson/Ljungvist 1999): 72 percent had majority control, 15 percent (86
firms) had blocking minorities of over 25 percent, and only around 10 percent (55
firms) had no blocking minority control. At least 55 corporations are vulnerable to
hostile tender offers. However, corporations with blocking minorities may also be
subject to “hostile” stake-building when multiple minority owners have competing
interests. Giving this looser criteria, the German market for corporate control encom-
passes up to 141 corporations.
Jackson, Höpner: An Emerging Market for Corporate Control? 17
dispersion of ownership, or through the sale of entire blocks to strategically inter-
ested companies as part of M&A transactions. In the short term, the latter method
may lead to both fragmentation and concentration in different parts of the corpo-
rate network, as illustrated by the planned merger of Allianz and Dresdner
Bank.14 However, in the long run, this step will greatly accelerate the unraveling
of strategic blocks and increase the dominance of financially oriented investors
who are likely to support hostile bids given appropriate share premiums. These
changes will likely gain momentum through positive feedback. Corporations
with fragmented ownership are more likely to adopt shareholder-value policies
that in turn encourage divestment by intercorporate ownership. Moreover,
growing divestment reinforces the change in the orientation of banks away from
relationship banking and toward investment banking.
                                                  
14 On the one hand, mergers through share swaps lead to a larger circle of shareholders
and decrease the relative strength of existing blocks. On the other hand, some re-
newed concentration may occur when blocks held in a common receiving company
are consolidated, such as the stakes in Aachener und Münchener Beteiligungs AG
held both by Allianz (5.1 percent) and Dresdner Bank (4.6 percent).
Table 4 Ownership Stakes in the 100 Largest German Companies, 1978 to 1998,
in Percent
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Majority held by
single individual,
family, or
foundation 18 18 25 24 23 21 23 19 17 19 18
Majority held by
foreign company 20 22 16 19 18 16 17 16 18 14 17
Majority held by
government 11 8 11 10 14 13 8 11 13 13 13
Other majorities 4 5 5 6 4 4 6 5 5 6 9
Dispersed
ownershipa 22 23 23 23 25 28 30 29 29 27 22
No clear
majorities 25 24 20 18 16 18 16 20 18 21 21
a Over 50% of ownership is fragmented (possible minority blockholders).
Sources: Hauptgutachten der Monopolkommission, various years.
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2. Influence of Banks. Even among firms with fragmented ownership, banks are
often thought to play a defensive role. Apart from the large blocks of direct own-
ership, banks can also influence corporate control through proxy voting and Su-
pervisory Board seats. A study of shareholder voting at 24 widely held firms
during 1992 demonstrates the importance of proxy voting: An average of 58 per-
cent of share capital was represented at the annual general meetings, and nearly
61 percent of votes were cast by bank proxy (Baums/Fraune 1995: 102). Until re-
cently, banks have generally opposed hostile takeovers. Baums (1993) notes that
private banks are usually also widely held corporations and have little interest in
being exposed to hostile bids themselves. For example, 95 percent of the shares at
Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank are widely held. At the 1992 shareholders’
meeting at Deutsche Bank, less than half of the share capital was represented,
some 55 percent of votes were cast by proxy by the five largest German banks,
and 32 percent of votes were controlled by proxy by Deutsche Bank itself (Baums/
Fraune 1995). Among fragmented firms, banks control the majority of shares
voted at the shareholders’ meeting through the proxy votes exercised by the de-
pository banks. Proxy votes can be used to support management by amending
corporate statutes with anti-takeover provisions.
Over the last decade, the behavior of German banks has changed substantially.
Some banks have been important actors in supporting hostile bids. The takeover of
Hoesch by Krupp in 1991 was a hallmark case. Krupp was informally supported
in its takeover attempt by its house bank WestLB, which accumulated a 12 per-
cent stake in Hoesch. Likewise, Deutsche Bank was supposedly informed and
supported the Krupp bid despite its role as Hoesch’s house bank and its seat
chairing Hoesch’s Supervisory Board. Similar cases exist in which house banks
are rumored to have helped acquiring firms accumulate stakes, e.g., Buderus or
Holzmann. Banks face growing dilemmas regarding their governance role as they
shift from traditional “house bank” relations toward investment banking services.
This is well illustrated by the battle for control over Thyssen in 1997. Deutsche
Bank was active in advising Krupp in the unfriendly takeover bid, while its man-
agement held a seat on Thyssen’s Supervisory Board. The implied conflicts of in-
terest received sharp public criticism and protest from the industrial union IG
Metall.
3. Codetermination. The rights of employees also have a negative impact on take-
over activity. First, employee representation on the Supervisory Board lessens the
direct influence of shareholders. Employee representatives are likely to support
defensive actions taken by management in the event of takeover battles. Co-
determination can be particularly decisive if the shareholder side of the Supervi-
sory Board is divided among competing factions. The “parity” codetermination
rules for companies falling under the Codetermination Act of 1951 (Montanmitbes-
timmung) create an additional barrier in takeover attempts, since the Supervisory
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Board is chaired by a “neutral” person entitled to cast a tie-breaking vote that can
block changes in management. Second, the institutional protection of employ-
ment and consensus in corporate restructuring reduces the capacity of hostile
raiders to engage in ex post redistribution of wealth following takeovers.
4. Accounting and Disclosure Issues. German accounting and disclosure rules are
generally considered to lack transparency. Substantial discretion exists in the
creation of hidden reserves and the valuation of assets. Traditionally, German ac-
counting has stressed very conservative prudence rules (Vorsichtsprinzip) and
creditor protection. These rules favor a long-term business conservatism allowing
firms to build up substantial reserves for rainy days. For example, up to 50 per-
cent of profits can be dedicated to reserves with the approval of the Supervisory
Board and the shareholders’ meeting. Furthermore, the valuation of assets at
book rather than market prices leads to hidden valuation reserves. By contrast,
both international standards (IAS) and U.S. rules (GAAP) are more investor ori-
ented and are guided more exclusively by the notion of providing capital market
participants with the necessary information to estimate true company value. U.S.
rules therefore stress market valuations and precise definition of profits. While
large reserves might make German companies attractive targets, the general im-
pact of accounting standards would seem to deter takeover activity since the un-
certain risks to bidders is large: Liabilities remain undisclosed, and true levels of
profit may be hard to gauge (Schmidt 1997: 128–129). In addition, strict capital
protection rules in German accounting prohibit the use of certain financial tech-
niques during takeovers. Most importantly, this inhibits takeovers financed
through the assets of target firms such as the large levered buyouts (LBOs) in the
United States.
Another strategic issue concerns the disclosure of ownership stakes. Until re-
cently, disclosure was required only for stakes exceeding 25 percent compared
with the disclosure thresholds of 5 percent in the United States and 3 percent in
Britain. Likewise, most firms issue bearer shares which make the identity of
shareholders hard for the company to determine. Lack of disclosure has contra-
dictory effects on takeover strategies and defenses. On the one hand, bidders
have the advantage of being able to accumulate quite large stakes without being
detected. This was the case in the Krupp-Hoesch deal, since Krupp was able to
secretly accumulate a 24.9 percent stake through Credit Suisse prior to attempting
a takeover (Jenkinson/Ljungvist 1999: 29). However, on the other hand, lack of
transparency might discourage potential bidders, since they cannot estimate the
power of minority blockholders acting as white knights in defending the target
company either. Minority blockholders can easily hide their true influence by di-
viding stakes among family members or formally separate organizations. Similar
to accounting rules, lack of disclosure makes takeover battles even more uncer-
tain and risky than would otherwise be the case. Other things being equal, such
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rules likely lower the level of takeover activity. Disclosure regulations were
changed in 1998 to require reporting of stakes at the thresholds of 5, 10, 25, 50 or
75 percent.
5. Company Law. Corporate law discourages hostile bids by separating voting
rights from the factual ability to control. Under the two-tiered board structure,
shareholder representatives on Supervisory Boards can only be removed before
their term expires with a super-majority of 75 percent of votes cast. At the Man-
agement Board level, management is usually appointed for five-year terms by the
Supervisory Board (rather than by the shareholders’ meeting) and can only be
dismissed for cause. Baums (1993) notes that such dismissal is valid until nullified
by a court and that management is likely to leave voluntarily after a hostile bid
has been successfully completed. Nonetheless, majorities at the shareholders’
meeting are not enough to guarantee control over the Supervisory Board or the
Management Board. In some cases involving hostile stakes, existing minorities
can deny blockholders representation on the Supervisory Board and thus thwart
their influence, at least temporarily.
Another important aspect in the Mannesmann case was the so-called law of
groups of companies (Konzernrecht). This law addresses control rights associated
with company groups in order to protect minority shareholders and creditors of
subsidiary companies. In cases such as Vodafone, where the acquirer is another
company, German law requires the conclusion of a “conglomerate contract” (Be-
herrschungsvertrag) in order to protect the interests of the subordinate company.
In the Mannesmann case, the sale of a recently purchased British telecom com-
pany, Orange, was at issue. The sale of Orange would be viewed as against the
interests of Mannesmann and only possible through a contract requiring both a
75 percent super-majority shareholder resolution and compensation for affected
parties.
6. Competition Law. Mergers must be approved under competition law by the Fed-
eral Cartel Office. While German antitrust law lacks any strong bias against
mergers when compared internationally, the European market is now increas-
ingly taken as a reference point for economic concentration rather than the na-
tional market. This change in competition policy can be considered to have had a
pro-merger effect since the mid-1990s.
7. Defensive Actions. Managerial defenses against takeovers are common in the
United States. Many Anglo-American defenses are not allowed under German
law (or at least have not been until recently), including share buy-backs, shares
with multiple voting rights, and poison pills. Much attention has been paid to
poison pills and golden parachutes, which are particularly uncommon in Ger-
many. However, German management has a number of other defenses available.
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Until the year 2000, company law allowed corporations to have special voting
rights or voting rights restrictions within their company statutes. Jenkinson and
Ljungvist (1999) mention the following defenses among listed companies in
1991: 6.6 percent only listed non-voting shares on the stock exchange, 3.8 percent
had caps on voting rights, 4.5 percent limited share transferability, and 5.7 per-
cent departed from “one share, one vote” principles. Among widely held firms,
caps on voting rights were particularly common, typically restricting votes to 5
percent of company stock and being important in several prominent takeover
battles such as Continental vs. Pirelli and Feldmühle Nobel. A final very impor-
tant takeover defense relates to the registration of shares. A fair number of corpo-
rations, including listed corporations, retain a system whereby management has
discretion in registering shares. Management can refuse to register the shares of
the acquirer or delay registering, thereby denying or delaying the exercise of
shareholder rights.
8. Corporate Culture. Several aspects of German corporate culture also tend to dis-
courage hostile takeover bids. German management was traditionally strongly
oriented toward production and engineering. Financial specialists rarely became
the speaker of the Management Board. Thus a “financial conception of corporate
control” (Fligstein 1990) never became the dominant organizational paradigm in
Germany, and the firm was not viewed merely as financial revenue streams to be
optimized. An emphasis on structural and operational aspects of management
leads to greater importance being placed on the organizational compatibility of
two firms during a merger. Another aspect is the strong orientation toward con-
sensus decision-making within the Board itself. German law sees the Manage-
ment Board as a collegial entity with collective responsibility for corporate deci-
sions. Many boards did not even elect a spokesperson until the late 1980s
(Höpner 2000a). This consensus orientation entails strong veto rights and may
work against both initiating takeover bids and undertaking radical restructuring
after takeovers.
More broadly, the German public has a relatively weak “equity culture.” Stock
market activity is viewed as inherently risky and speculative. The U.S. experience
with hostile takeovers, bust-ups, corporate downsizing, and shareholder value
was widely considered ruthless “Wild West” tactics in Germany. Thus public ac-
ceptance of takeover battles and arguments relating takeovers to efficiency have
generally been viewed with skepticism.
Germany has no law that specifically regulates takeover bids, and the proposed
European directive on takeovers has not been passed. Lack of binding takeover
regulations might be considered a deterrent to takeovers due to the uncertain le-
gal status. In particular, management may be able to initiate value-destroying de-
fensive tactics that make the target unattractive. Germany did introduce a volun-
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tary takeover code in 1995 to protect shareholder interests during takeover bids.
The code was developed by a small committee within the Ministry of Finance
(Börsensachverständigenkommission) and was passed without any large input from
companies and business associations such as the Federation of German Industries
(Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie) (Vitols et al. 1997). The takeover code was
strongly influenced by the British code and is monitored by an Office of the
Takeover Commission (Geschäftsstelle der Übernahmekommission). Compliance with
the code has been very weak: 540 of some 933 listed companies comply, as do 79
of the DAX-100 corporations (Bundesministerium der Finanzen 2000). Low com-
pliance may relate to legal ambiguities in the code and to the lack of effective
sanctions. For example, unlike in Britain, companies cannot be delisted for failure
to comply. Although the code includes provisions for mandatory public bids,
overall the code is bidder-friendly compared with the British code and should not
be considered a deterrent to hostile takeovers.
3.2 Hostile “Stake-Building” as a Mechanism of Control?
Despite the lack of public tender offers, the control of German corporations can
be challenged by building hostile stakes. Unlike the more open markets in liberal
market economies, hostile changes of control in Germany are often triggered by
the breakup of an existing coalition among several large shareholders, leading to
new alliances. Jenkinson and Ljungvist (1999) identified 17 cases of hostile stake-
building between 1988 and 1996. In terms of ownership, eight target firms had no
blocking minority stakes of more than 25 percent, seven firms had one or more
blocking minority stakes, and two firms were majority owned. Most predators
were other companies operating in the same industry as the targets rather than
individuals. Only two cases involved conglomerates. Non-German predators
were involved in nine cases, thus accounting for a large proportion of hostile at-
tempts at control. Predator firms were successfully fought off in only three of 17
cases, twice due to intervention by the Cartel Office and once because of voting
right restrictions at Continental AG. In two further cases, target firms capitulated
and agreed to “friendly” cooperation. Although hostile stake-building resulted in
changes in management, the performance effects of control battles appears to be
rather weak.
Unlike hostile stake-building, the Mannesmann case was unprecedented in post-
war Germany as a successful hostile takeover bid made on the open market.
Whereas other hostile attempts at control were decided by relatively small coali-
tions of large blockholders, the fate of Mannesmann was decided by a much
larger number of dispersed shareholders, including the general public. The case
thus represents a new mechanism of corporate control that raises numerous
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questions examined in the next section, including the degree to which Mannes-
mann is an exceptional case or whether it suggests change within German corpo-
rate governance.
4 The Case of Mannesmann15
Mannesmann was founded in 1890 by Reinhard and Max Mannesmann, the in-
ventors of a new method for the production of seamless tubes. The brothers
raised capital through their personal connections, these leading to Werner
Siemens and Georg Siemens at Deutsche Bank. Deutsche Bank was soon instru-
mental in wresting control of the ailing firm away from the Mannesmann broth-
ers and installed a new Management Board in 1893. Through World War I, Deut-
sche Bank held positions on the Supervisory Board, controlled proxy votes, and
had a virtual monopoly in the credit business. The strength of this influence by a
bank was unique among German heavy industry at the time (Wellhöner 1989:
125–146). The company expanded into coal and steel at the beginning of the 20th
century. From the early 1970s onward, Mannesmann again transformed itself into
a multinational corporation with a successful machine tools division and inte-
grated an automotive division in the 1980s. However, the most radical change
began in the 1990s. Following the liberalization of the German telecommunica-
tions market, Mannesmann set up a new mobile phone network, D2. Between
1990 and 1999, some two thirds of total investment went to telecommunications.
Whereas engineering and automotive products are still seen as being a “value
driver,” the sale of the historic tubes division was planned. Through acquisitions
of domestic and foreign companies,16 Mannesmann had become a central player
in European telecommunications next to Vodafone, British Telecom, France Tele-
com, the Dutch KPN, and Deutsche Telekom. By the late 1990s, telecommunica-
tions accounted for the largest share of turnover among the divisions.
In May 1999, Klaus Esser succeeded Joachim Funk as chair of the Management
Board. Esser holds a doctorate in law, and his managerial career began at Man-
nesmann in 1977. He was the financial officer of the Board from 1994 to 1998 and
                                                  
15 The authors would like to thank the following people for interviews between Fall
1999 and Summer 2000: Gerd Kappelhoff, IG Metall, union representative Thyssen-
Krupp; Roland Köstler, legal officer, Hans-Böckler Foundation; Werner Nass, works
council Thyssen-Krupp; Horst Urban, ex-chairman Continental AG; Christoph W.
Stein and Fabian Kirchmann, Mannesmann AG, Department of Investor Relations;
Rainer Schmidt, IG Metall, union representative Mannesmann.
16 Mannesmann purchased majority stakes at Arcor (D), Otelo (D), Infostrade (I), Om-
nitel (I), Telering (A), and Orange (UK).
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was acting chair in 1998. The promotion of financial officers to Board chair is still
somewhat unusual in Germany, because engineers tend to have a stronger posi-
tion in industrial firms (Höpner 2000a). In October 1999, Esser announced the
spin-off of the classic industrial business areas and a future specialization solely
on telecommunications. Institutional investors had demanded focus on a core
competence, but Esser sought to build telecommunications internally until the
division could survive alone in the market. Esser argued for the restructuring in
order to offer capital markets a stock with a clear financial logic, since telecom-
munications are valued much higher in the market than traditional machine tools
and automotive businesses. The IPO of these two divisions as a separate company
was planned for the year 2000.
4.1 Ownership, the Stock Market, and “Shareholder Value”
Share prices at Mannesmann have risen dramatically during the last few years.
Mannesmann was one of the largest firms of the DAX-30 index, accounting for
11.5 percent in 1999, and its outperformance made a major contribution to the
growth of the DAX in the late 1990s. Whereas Mannesmann stock was valued at
34 euros in 1996, shares could be sold at 300 euros in February 2000. As with
leading telecommunications companies, the market valued Mannesmann at as-
tronomically high levels, reflected in its price–earnings ratio (PER) of 56.1 in Sep-
tember 1999 (quite similar to Vodafone’s PER of 54.4). However, Mannesmann
and Vodafone continued to represent the different “equilibria” discussed in Sec-
tion 2.2 with regard to German and British corporations. In 1992, Mannesmann’s
PBR was just 1.4, but grew over the 1990s to 10.2 in 1999. Meanwhile, Vodafone
had a PBR of 7.7, which grew to some 125.5 in 1999. Despite their roughly equal
market capitalization (Vodafone was worth some 175 billion euros and Mannes-
mann 160 billion euros in February 2000), Vodafone was valued much higher
relative to its real assets, sales, and employment.
Despite this strong share performance, Mannesmann was not part of the van-
guard of the shareholder-value movement in German corporations. Mannesmann
received very good ratings for investor relations, alongside DaimlerChrysler and
SAP. However, its accounting practices were considered to lack transparency.
Unlike many German corporations of its size and international orientation, Man-
nesmann had not yet adopted IAS or U.S.-GAAP standards, nor had it pursued a
listing on the New York Stock Exchange. Moreover, managerial compensation
was not tightly coupled to share prices. Few shareholder value-oriented perform-
ance criteria, such as discounted cash flow, had been implemented on the opera-
tional level. On the whole, Mannesmann management remained less capital mar-
ket oriented than would be predicted on the basis of indicators such as size, in-
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ternational orientation, level of diversification, and ownership structure (Höpner
2001a). However, Esser’s tenure undoubtedly marked an increasing shareholder
orientation, especially by the refocusing of the business and efforts at increased
information for shareholders, in contrast to the situation under Joachim Funk,
where, as one Board member put it, the Supervisory Board “had to chase after
every piece of information.” Even its investor relations department characterized
its own attitude toward publicity as “conservative.” Mannesmann also began a
policy oriented toward value creation known as the “value increase process”
(VIP). VIP procedures were targeted at optimizing current investments in areas
with above-average rates of return. The primary target within the VIP scheme
was a 20 percent gross return on assets, a figure that Mannesmann also commu-
nicated to external investors. The figure measures the operating profitability and
is a firm-specific version of the more general return on investment measure.
Mannesmann was criticized by a number of analysts and investors, who were
more interested in return on equity. Decentralized targets were set for the various
divisions.
The ownership structure of Mannesmann was uncommon in Germany. For a long
time, Mannesmann had had the most international ownership structure of any
German firm (excluding foreign subsidiaries), with over 60 percent of its shares
held by foreign investors and 40 percent alone by U.S. and British investors. Up
until the takeover of Orange, there were no large shareholders and 100 percent of
the shares were fragmented. Ownership fragmentation led to very low voting
participation at the shareholders’ meetings: just 37 percent of capital was repre-
sented and 90 percent of these votes were cast through the proxy rights of banks,
the highest rate of any German corporation (Baums/Fraune 1995).
After the share swap with Orange, the ownership structure changed through the
introduction of Orange’s largest shareholder, the diversified Hong Kong con-
glomerate Hutchison Whampoa.17 Hutchison now owned a 10.2 percent stake in
Mannesmann. Hutchison was a large shareholder willing to back the existing
management in the takeover battle. In addition, an estimated maximum of 7.5
percent was individually owned by some 40,000 employee stockholders. During
the takeover battle, John Sweeney of the American union federation AFL-CIO
claimed that some 13 percent of shares were held by pension funds directly or in-
directly in union control. This amount has never been confirmed and is likely ex-
tremely inflated. At the time of the takeover bid, a realistic estimate may therefore
be that 15 percent of Mannesmann shares were in loyal hands.
                                                  
17 Hutchison Whampoa controlled a 49 percent stake in Orange PLC.
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Table 5 Largest Shareholders at Mannesmann AG, 1999
Shareholder Country/Number Percent
Hutchison Whampoa Hongkong 10.2
Capital Research & Management U.S. 2.8
Schroder Investment Management UK 2.1
Janus Capital Corp. U.S. 1.8
Templeton Investment Management UK / Hongkong 1.8
Deka Deutsche Kapitalgesellschaft D 1.8
Deutsche Asset Management D / U.S. / UK 1.6
Alliance Capital Management U.S. 1.5
American Express Asset Management U.S. 1.1
DWS Deutsche Gesellschaft für Wertpapiersparen D 1.0
Fidelity Management & Research Company U.S. / UK 0.9
Foreign & Colonial Management UK 0.9
Putnam Investment Management U.S. 0.7
Commerzbank Investment Management D 0.7
Dresdner Bank Investment Management D 0.7
MFS Investment Management U.S. 0.7
Union Investment Gesellschaft D 0.6
Oppenheim Kapitalgesellschaft D 0.6
UBS Brinson CH / D 0.6
Allianz Kapitalanlagegesellschaft D 0.6
Robur Kapitalfervaltning S 0.6
Frankfurt Trust Investment Gesellschaft D 0.5
Allfonds Bayerische Kapitalanlage D 0.5
Universal-Investment-Gesellschaft D 0.5
Mercury Asset Management UK 0.5
Adig Allgemeine Deutsche Investment D 0.5
Inka-Internationale KAG D 0.5
Cumulative total, stakes of 1% or more 10 shareholders 25.7 (15.5)a
Cumulative total, stakes of 0.5% or more 27 shareholders 36.3 (26.1)a
Cumulative total, stakes of 0.1% or more 63 shareholders 44.3 (34.1)a
  Subtotal Germany 13.1
  Subtotal UK, USA 19.2
a Totals in parentheses shown excluding Hutchison Whampoa.
Source: Wirtschaftswoche, January 20, 2000, data provided by Thomson Financial Securities Data.
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The real battle was over the support of various institutional investors holding
dispersed stakes. First, all shareholders holding stakes of 0.1 percent or more
were institutional investors such as mutual funds and asset management compa-
nies (with the exception of Hutchison mentioned above). Of these, German funds
controlled only 13 percent of Mannesmann, compared with over 19 percent by
British and U.S. funds. Second, ownership was highly dispersed (see Table 5). The
ten shareholders holding stakes of 1 percent or more controlled a total of 25.7
percent, and 63 shareholders holding states of 0.1 percent or more controlled a
total of 44.3 percent of Mannesmann (or 34.1 percent excluding Hutchison). Thus
these shareholders lacked stakes large enough to exert coordinated control and
did not have strategic incentives for holding shares.
4.2 The Takeover Bid
Vodafone and Mannesmann were publicly considered alliance partners up until
Fall 1999.18 Unlike Mannesmann, Vodafone focused on mobile networks and has
no fixed-line communications network. Another difference was the large number
of minority stakes held by Vodafone in 13 European and ten non-European
countries, reaching some 31 million customers. In Britain, Vodafone was market
leader ahead of OnetoOne (taken over by Deutsche Telekom), Orange, and British
Telecom. After its 1999 takeover of Airtouch (USA), Vodafone became the world’s
largest mobile telecommunications provider. Mannesmann and Vodafone shared
joint participation in E-Plus, and Vodafone came to control a 34.8 percent stake in
Mannesmann Mobilfunk previously held by Airtouch. Vodafone sought to ex-
pand these joint activities prior to the takeover bid.
In late October 1999, Mannesmann made a takeover bid for Orange (UK) worth
some 30 billion euros scheduled for November 9. This move threatened Voda-
fone’s home market, and rumors quickly spread that Vodafone might react by
making a takeover bid for Mannesmann. These speculations fueled Mannesmann
shares to new highs, and on November 14 Vodafone’s Chris Gent traveled to
Düsseldorf to make a friendly merger offer. The offer involved a swap of 43.7
Vodafone shares for one Mannesmann share. Esser refused this offer as unaccept-
able. By this time, the stock market anticipated a hostile takeover attempt by Vo-
dafone. Mannesmann’s Supervisory Board approved Esser’s refusal of the
friendly merger at the end of November. Chris Gent then announced that he
would take the swap offer directly to the shareholding public. This move began a
                                                  
18 In an N-TV interview on July 17, 2001, Klaus Esser said that Vodafone had indicated
to him that it intended to place a merger bid for Mannesmann some 8 months prior
to the actual takeover bid.
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campaign of interviews, advertising, and arguments unprecedented in German
economic history. The media battle was underway before the official takeover bid
was made on December 23, 1999. The bid improved upon the original offer, pro-
posing a swap of 53.7 Vodafone shares for one Mannesmann share as a pure
swap with no cash component.
Vodafone’s published takeover bid stressed the economies of scale through the
merger. A merged Vodafone, Airtouch, and Mannesmann would be represented
in 25 countries and have majority stakes in 13 countries, a total of 42.4 million
customers. The central focus of Gent’s argumentation was that the market value
of a combined company would exceed the sum of the two separate companies.
Gent also used the media to address the employees of Mannesmann, arguing
about the industrial logic of a merger. He distanced himself from the aggressive
practices of hostile takeovers common in the United States during the 1980s,
stressed the industrial rather than speculative motives for the takeover, and made
assurances that no closures or redundancies were planned. Instead, between one
half and one billion euros would be invested. In its news ads, Mannesmann was
portrayed as a baby that needs a good mother, Vodafone, in order to grow.
Another element of Gent’s rhetorical strategy repeatedly became apparent: he ac-
knowledged the fact that hostile takeovers had generally been viewed as morally
bad in Germany. Gent attempted to portray Vodafone in the role of the victim
rather than aggressor. The takeover of Orange had betrayed Mannesmann’s role
as a strategic ally and had made it a fierce competitor. Discussions of a joint
European strategy had been thrown out by Mannesmann’s sudden and unan-
nounced takeover, stabbing Vodafone in the back as it were. By contrast, Gent de-
scribed Vodafone as being appropriate, honest, and playing by the rules. Voda-
fone would abide by the rules of Germany’s voluntary takeover code, although
the German code is actually more bidder-friendly than the British code, since it
allows subsequent improvements to the offer, permits pure share swaps without
cash, and is more restrictive of defense measures by the target firm’s manage-
ment.
4.3 The Defensive Strategy Pursued by Mannesmann
Mannesmann’s defensive strategy was more complex. Before 1998, Mannesmann
management had not generally considered a hostile takeover bid as a realistic
threat. Thus little defensive planning was done before 1999. In addition to an at-
tempt to portray Vodafone’s offer as a value-destroying measure, technical ar-
guments were presented to call into question the success of the bid. Paramount
were a series of procedural questions about the necessary divestments of Orange.
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It is remarkable that a particular rhetorical strategy was not used by Esser: He did
not question the legitimacy of a hostile takeover in principle and did not call for
the participation of other stakeholders in the decision. In the published state-
ments made by Mannesmann, there is no reference to the dangers of job losses or
the expected erosion of Supervisory Board codetermination after conclusion of a
“control contract.” Esser never questioned that the shareholders alone should de-
cide the fate of the company. During the hostile attacks on Thyssen by Krupp
(1997) and Continental by Pirelli (1991), defensive rhetoric was full of such refer-
ences.
In its official statement, Mannesmann’s Management Board laid out its plans for
the development of the company. The heart of their strategy was the integration
of mobile communication networks, fixed-line networks, and the Internet. This
strategy was designed to increase customer loyalty over the long term, raise the
value of sales per customer, and lower customer turnover rates. Vodafone’s ar-
gument that fixed-line networks had no future was refuted, and Vodafone was
criticized as underestimating the importance of the Internet. According to Man-
nesmann, the future of communications technology lay in the combination of
these two previously separate technologies. By not investing in an integrated
strategy covering both areas, shareholder value would be destroyed. Vodafone’s
strategy of achieving scale through minority participations in so many countries
was also criticized, since bringing together cross-platform networks requires
more integrated control and entrepreneurial initiative.
Esser used a further argument to win shareholder loyalties for the existing man-
agement: the presence of Mannesmann in the German stock index (DAX) and
Euro-Stoxx. The investment strategy of many international funds reconstructs
and matches these indices. A successful takeover would remove Mannesmann
from the indices and force the divestment of index funds, leading to sinking share
prices. Esser estimated that index funds held 30 percent of Mannesmann share
capital. Esser obviously did not point out that this disadvantage would be par-
tially offset by the increasing weight of Vodafone in the FTSE-100 from its 3.03
percent share.
As the takeover battle continued through to the end of January 2000, technical
and procedural questions stemming from German company law and takeover
code dominated the discussion. Before approving the merger, the European Un-
ion competition regime would likely require divestment of Orange in order to
prevent a monopolistic market position for Vodafone in Britain. Mannesmann ar-
gued that, under German law, divestment of Orange required a “control con-
tract” between Vodafone and Mannesmann. In turn, a control contract requires a
cash payment to any minority shareholders not exchanging their shares, which
could amount up to some 60 billion euros and bring the company into financial
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difficulties. A control contract also requires a 75 percent majority at the share-
holders’ meeting, thus raising the quorum for control.19 The alternative route
would involve a long process: the election of a new Supervisory Board with a
simple majority at the next shareholders’ meeting, the installation of a new Man-
agement Board that would sell Orange, and only then completion of the merger.
Without a control contract, the Management Board would have to make decisions
in the interests of the company as a whole, and why should it be in the interests
of the company to sell Orange just after its acquisition? In short, Orange was
portrayed as a “poison pill” to deter a hostile takeover.
This discussion sparked legal debate over the prerequisites for successful divest-
ment. Vodafone denied the claims regarding control contracts and argued that a
simple majority was sufficient to complete the merger. German legal experts re-
mained divided over the issue. For example, whereas the prominent corporate
lawyer Theodor Baums supported the Mannesmann interpretation, other lawyers
suggested that divestment of Orange did not go beyond a routine managerial de-
cision as defined in German law20 and thus required only a normal majority.
Another peculiarity of German law entered into the discussion without playing
such a decisive role. The tax on speculative stock trading (profits on stock held for
less than one year) might require a de facto doubling of the time limit, since
12 months would have to elapse after the stock swap before shareholders could
take their profits without tax. Finally, Esser also argued that Mannesmann’s share
price increase made a swap unattractive as the price of Mannesmann shares
climbed before the deadline of the share swap. The IPO of the automobile and
engineering divisions was brought forward to capture such effects, and an an-
nouncement that the company was seeking a separate listing for Internet activi-
ties was made in January.
4.4 Banks and Investment Bankers
German banks are often cited as one of the main barriers to hostile takeovers, as
well as providing a functional substitute in corporate monitoring. However,
                                                  
19 The legal basis for control contracts is sec. 291 of the German Corporation Law.
Sec. 304 outlines the obligation to make compensatory payments to minority share-
holders. These provisions are designed to prevent control contracts from being used
in the interests of a single majority shareholder to exclude minority shareholders
from their share in profits.
20 The argument was that sale of a subsidiary is covered under sec. 311, which states
that control cannot be used to the detriment of the interests of a subsidiary company
unless compensation is given.
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banks played no role in Mannesmann’s defensive strategy. Mannesmann lacked
strong relations with a house bank, although Deutsche Bank manager Josef Acker-
mann was a member of its Supervisory Board. More generally, German banks
have been attempting a dramatic reorientation toward investment banking and
away from traditional banking relationships. While these two strategies were in
competition with one another in the mid-1990s, or were difficult to reconcile, it is
increasingly unlikely that banks will be involved in actively mobilizing takeover
defenses as in the past. The banks have learned that it is virtually impossible to
act both as an investment bank according the rules of the international market-
place and to simultaneously support the old style of relationship banking by
taking sides in a defensive strategy against takeovers. A revealing quote was
made by Klaus Breuer (Deutsche Bank, now Management Board chair) with ref-
erence to the Krupp-Thyssen takeover in 1997: “I very much hope that a first
large case [takeover] will set an example within our financial culture” (Spiegel 13/
1997: 94).
As consultants and advisors, investment banks play a central role in mergers and
acquisitions. Particularly during hostile battles, investment banks are doubly in-
volved: as consultants to the bidder firm and in the development of defensive
strategies for the target. More money is made when the takeover is successful
through the advice and refinancing provided during the post-merger restructur-
ing. As early as 1998, Mannesmann is alleged to have hired Morgan Stanley and
Deutsche Bank to develop defensive strategies to hostile bids from its six largest
competitors. During the takeover battle, Mannesmann was advised by Morgan
Stanley, Merrill Lynch, and J.P. Morgan. Meanwhile, Vodafone worked closely
with Goldman Sachs and Warburg Dillon Read. This list shows the importance of
U.S. investment banking, even in takeover contests between two European firms.
Table 6 shows the ten most important investment banks in the 1999 M&A market.
Due to the high concentration, target firms may have difficulty in finding advi-
sors that are not involved with the bidding firm (Huffschmid 1999: 78). In No-
vember 1999, Klaus Esser demanded that Goldman Sachs should stop advising
Vodafone. Since Goldman Sachs had advised Orange in its friendly merger with
Mannesmann, Esser argued that Goldman Sachs had access to inside information:
“I don’t think it’s a clean procedure if Goldman Sachs takes our documents to
Vodafone.” As a result, Goldman Sachs temporarily halted its consulting activity.
Meanwhile, Mannesmann filed a petition at the High Court in London to have
Goldman Sachs suspended from acting as a consultant, but the suit was refused
on the grounds that the information involved was not confidential enough to
warrant it. In addition, the reverse situation also became public: Morgan Stanley
had also advised Airtouch during its takeover by Vodafone, but was now advis-
ing Mannesmann.
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4.5 The Role of Labor: Works Councils, Employee Share Ownership,
and Unions
Codetermination was also discussed above as an institutional element that might
act as a poison pill to prevent hostile takeovers. Mannesmann was one of the cor-
porations with the most extensive parity model of codetermination (Montanmit-
bestimmung). Following World War II, Mannesmann very much belonged to the
iron, coal, and steel industries governed by the strictest codetermination laws.
Two differences from the “normal” model of codetermination are worth men-
tioning here. First, whereas the chair of the Supervisory Board is normally elected
by shareholders and holds a “double vote” to break deadlocks, here the chair is a
“neutral” person jointly agreed upon by the shareholder and labor representa-
tives. Second, the labor director within the Management Board is appointed with
the consent of the labor representatives. For over 20 years, Mannesmann sought
to flee the jurisdiction of these laws and even contested them in court. Mannes-
mann first removed steel production from the jurisdiction of the holding com-
pany by creating a separate subsidiary (Mannesmann Röhrenwerke AG). As steel
accounted for less than 50 percent of turnover, Mannesmann legally contested the
application of the law and caused considerable conflict with IG Metall in 1980/
1981. This conflict resulted in a special law that extended the old rules for another
six years and in 1988 in a revision lowering the threshold for the coal, iron, and
steel sector from 50 percent to just 20 percent of sales (Kittner 1997: 1105). In May
1999, the Constitutional Court ruled that Mannesmann no longer falls under the
jurisdiction of the Codetermination Act of 1951 by declaring these special laws
Table 6 Investment Bank Consultants in M&A Deals, 1999
Bank Value of transactions
Billion U.S. $
Number of deals
Goldman Sachs 1278.6 415
M. Stanley Dean Witter 1131.3 446
Merrill Lynch 1026.0 376
Credit Suisse First Boston 526.9 327
J.P. Morgan 514.6 240
Warburg Dillon Read 489.2 278
Salomon Smith Barney 455.6 275
Lazard Houses 375.0 164
Lehman Brothers 310.8 193
Deutsche Bank 290.9 223
Source: Handelsblatt, January 3, 2000. Data from Thomson Financial Securities Data.
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unconstitutional. Nonetheless, the labor director elected under these laws, Sieg-
mar Sattler, remained on the Management Board throughout the takeover battle.
The crucial institution during the takeover battle was the conglomerate-level
works council (Konzernbetriebsrat). This institution has a largely coordinating
function, as a meeting place for the representatives of all eight subsidiaries and
the negotiation of framework agreements for the entire corporation, such as in the
area of part-time work for older workers. Most legal codetermination rights are
vested at lower levels and realized by the works councils of the individual sub-
sidiary companies (Gesamtbetriebsrat) or a “committee of the works councils” (Ar-
beitsgemeinschaft der Betriebsräte) as a contractually based simplification of these
structures. Due to the company’s status as a diversified conglomerate and hold-
ing company, the corporate cultures and strength of codetermination at the dif-
ferent subsidiaries differ widely. Codetermination is particularly strong in the
traditional areas such as steel, but less developed in the area of telecommunica-
tions, which has lower rates of union organization.
Much discussion took place about the compatibility of capital market-oriented
management and codetermination in Germany. The measures taken to reorient
Mannesmann toward shareholder value were largely welcomed by IG Metall and
the works councils. The growing transparency of corporate information was
praised by labor representatives profiting from better information. More surpris-
ing is that the planned breakup of Mannesmann into legally separate corpora-
tions was not only welcomed, but actively promoted by labor. The explanation
lies in the heterogeneous structure of the company. Telecommunications had be-
come the focal segment and attracted a growing proportion of funds for invest-
ment. A union member of Mannesmann described the situation as follows: “The
development of telecommunications was gradually becoming dangerous for the
other divisions. At the same time as billions were being spent on the acquisition
of Orange, we had to fight for every hammer in the classical businesses.” The re-
turn on investment for the traditional businesses was lower, but the risks were
also much lower too. Organized labor supported the separation of these firms in
order to allow these business to continue an “undisturbed” development. Con-
versely, the telecommunications business was arguably also restricted by its po-
sition within the larger business. Financial theory suggests that a diversified cor-
poration undergoes a “conglomerate discount” in the stock market that makes
acquisitions more expensive, although in practice Mannesmann was increasingly
overvalued rather than undervalued.
The example of Mannesmann shows that spin-offs and return to corporate spe-
cialization can be undertaken with a consensus between shareholders, manage-
ment, and labor. Here, capital market orientation and codetermination via “co-
management” are hardly irreconcilable opposites. Both groups share common
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interests in promoting competitiveness and managerial accountability, even if
their class interests may conflict in other areas such as wages. Class conflicts have
lost some of their sharpness since the mid-1990s relative to employee concern
over questions of risk management, transparency, business strategies, and per-
verse incentives given to management. In these areas, the differences between in-
vestors and employees are not diametrically opposed; instead, each actor may
prefer different approaches to reach similar goals.
Labor representatives were justifiably afraid of job losses following a successful
takeover and resulting reorganization. As a result, the works council and union
cooperated to prevent the takeover. It is notable that the friendly or hostile nature
of the takeover did not play a central role in their argumentation. Instead, labor
stressed their demands regarding industrial strategy: the integrated telecommu-
nications strategy (fixed-line networks, mobile networks, Internet) should remain
intact, the planned strategy for Mannesmann Röhrenwerke should also remain
intact, and the planned IPO of the engineering and automotive businesses should
go ahead. In mid-November, some 500 white-collar employees took part in a
warning strike by leaving their offices five minutes before noon to demonstrate
against the hostile bid. At the same time, the various works councils held a joint
press conference. The union and works councils view it as a success that the tele-
communications workers were as much involved in the protest activities as those
from the industrial businesses. IG Metall boss Klaus Zwickel, a member of the
Supervisory Board at Mannesmann, repeatedly voiced his position on the take-
over: Mannesmann is a healthy company with excellent prospects and has a su-
perior strategy to Vodafone, he said. Astonishingly, little conflictual reactions
came from labor, in sharp contrast to the mass demonstrations and emotions
during the 1997 takeover attempt of Thyssen by Krupp (Höpner 2001b).
Up until February 2000, an estimated maximum of 7.5 percent of share capital
was held by individual employee owners. Opponents of the takeover sought to
mobilize the loyalty of this block to refuse the offer. Employee shareholders have
an ambivalent function in such battles. On the one hand, employee stock owner-
ship plans (ESOPs) are often given by shareholder value-oriented corporations to
focus their employees on profitability targets. On the other hand, employees are
strategic owners with long-term interests in the corporation beyond the maximi-
zation of shareholder returns. The employee stake at Mannesmann therefore does
not automatically translate into a unified 7.5 percent block of votes against the
takeover. In addition, many stocks may have already been sold by employees,
thereby reducing the total to far below 7.5 percent. Thus the representation of
employee-owned shares at the shareholders’ meeting is not usually very high.
Following the Mannesmann takeover, a growing number of companies21 are at-
                                                  
21 Pioneering associations were created at Siemens, Salzgitter, and Deutsche Lufthansa,
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tempting to organize employee owners into associations in order to bundle their
votes and assure representation by an elected proxy. Lacking any such organiza-
tion, the Mannesmann works council appealed to employees not to sell their
shares. But at the end of November, the magazine Wirtschaftswoche reported that
following the dramatic appreciation of share prices after the bid, a notable por-
tion of employee owners had sold shares. In the end, employee ownership played
no decisive role.
The results of the sensational announcement by the American AFL-CIO that 13
percent of Mannesmann was held by funds in union control was ultimately inef-
fective too. According to William Patterson, Director of the Office of Investment,
“This decision is not just about the takeover, but about a basic principle. It in-
volves the question of whether the Anglo-American or European model creates
more value for investors over the long-term. We believe that the European model,
which seeks consensus between employees and employers, is the more success-
ful” (Handelsblatt, November 24, 1999). By late November, it had become clear
that only 1 percent to 2 percent of shares were under the direct control of the
AFL-CIO. Union President John Sweeney sent an eight-page letter to some 50 U.S.
investment managers holding Mannesmann stakes, appealing to them to refuse
the takeover bid. “The managers of the employees’ capital have a responsibility to
invest in funds that promote the interests of investors in the long-term,” wrote
Sweeney (emphasis added). However, the AFL-CIO is unlikely to influence funds
outside its direct management. This union involvement did spark an intensive
discussion among German unions about using pension funds and employee stock
ownership to promote employee-oriented corporate governance. In February
2000, the chairman of the union federation, Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB),
Dieter Schulte proclaimed it a bold notion that the DGB could make up some of
its lost influence over corporations through share ownership. German unions are
anticipating the move toward a greater role for pension funds in the social secu-
rity system and arguing that labor should have a voice in the resulting invest-
ment decisions.
4.6 “Germany – Where Capitalism Operates a Little Differently”:
Corporate Culture in Politics, Press, and Public
The above headline from The Guardian (November 23, 1999) symbolizes the public
ambivalence over the resistance to the Vodafone bid. Was this a legitimate at-
tempt to defend German institutions or a nationalistic reaction to an inevitable
development of global finance? Those expecting that the “national card” might be
played to fight off Vodafone were taught otherwise. Only marginal “nationalis-
                                                                                                                                                 
for example.
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tic” reactions were apparent at the outset. For example, the German tabloid BILD
carried the title, “0173 [the prefix of Mannesmann’s mobile network] stays Ger-
man!” In the British press, German reactions were condemned as hysterical and
nationalist. However, such statements remained marginal and probably less pro-
nounced than British reactions to the friendly acquisition of Rolls Royce by
Volkswagen. On the whole, German public debate was dominated by sober dis-
cussion and a shareholder-oriented perspective. Given the memory of German
military aggression toward Britain, it might be conjectured that Germany faced
very substantial barriers to public argument. For example, arguments against the
takeover as eroding distinctive “German” institutions of corporate governance
would be predisposed to be seen as nationalistic. Here the politics of institutional
diversity dovetail with geopolitics and history.
In terms of political reactions, representatives of both the Social Democratic (SPD)
Government and the Christian Democratic (CDU) opposition openly opposed the
hostile takeover in Mannesmann’s home state of North Rhine-Westphalia. For ex-
ample, CDU official Jürgen Rüttgers said that hostile takeovers were a throwback
to raw Manchester capitalism and did not belong within the context of a social
market economy. Likewise, North Rhine-Westphalia Minister President Wolf-
gang Clement (SPD) spoke at the Mannesmann employees’ assembly and assured
the works council of his support. The Federal Government was considerably
more moderate. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD) warned that hostile take-
overs threat to destroy corporate culture that had grown up over time.
The takeover battle also coincided with the early phase of discussion over a Ger-
man takeover law in anticipation of the European Union directive. As discussed
above, Germany does not have a takeover law and only recently developed a
voluntary code. The code is surprisingly bidder-friendly, allowing bids to be im-
proved mid-way and not requiring any cash component. It is not surprising that
the takeover of Mannesmann has raised demands for a more target-friendly law
that would protect domestic firms. At the time of writing, consultations over a
takeover law have not been completed. One remarkable aspect is the demand
made by the President of the umbrella organization of the German Chambers of
Industry and Commerce that the breakup of corporations should be prevented by
law following hostile takeovers in order to prevent American-style conglomerate
bust-ups. Such provisions are very unlikely to be incorporated into the law.
Given that an open political conflict was avoided, Mannesmann and Vodafone
engaged advertising companies in an unprecedented campaign for the loyalty of
shareholders. Mannesmann reported investing some 170 million euros on take-
over defenses and 20 million euros for advertisements related to the takeover
battle alone, while Vodafone spent some three times this amount. Mannesmann’s
agencies such as KNNSK/BBDO in Hamburg were hired to counter Vodafone’s
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ads and vice versa. Thus a bizarre exchange of ads began, in which companies
themselves were the goods being sold.
Figure 1
Figure 2
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Figure 3
The first ad from Mannesmann (Fig. 1) in December 1999 shows a baby with the
name of its subsidiary telecommunications company with the caption “It has a lot
planned.” Vodafone (Fig. 2) responded with an ad showing a mother feeding its
baby with the caption, “Every Mann (a reference to Mannesmann) knows: If you
want to grow, you need a good mother.” Mannesmann again replied with a new
version of its original baby picture, this time with the caption “A hostile mother is
the worst thing in the world.” A further series of ads (Fig. 3) displays the German
signs for construction sites. Mannesmann captioned the ad “Warning! Vodafone
will turn your stock portfolio into a construction site.” Vodafone’s reply shows
the medieval fools’ hat used in the Rhineland carnival season with a caption sug-
gesting that Mannesmann were making fools of its shareholders. German news-
papers and magazines enjoyed high demand for full-page ads for the next three
months, often with the ads displayed opposite one another. Shareholder activists
are appalled at the high sums spent in the name of the shareholders’ interests,
and in December 1999 a lawsuit was filed to halt the spending but was refused by
the Landesgericht (higher court of first instance) in Düsseldorf.
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4.7 The Conclusion of the Takeover Battle
By mid-January 2000, it had become increasingly clear that the majority of Man-
nesmann shareholders would sell to Vodafone. Foreign shareholders seemed
clearly in favor of Vodafone, and they alone already held a majority of shares.
Among domestic shareholders, opinions were generally estimated to be split
50:50. The takeover battle was decided when Klaus Esser’s final and most spec-
tacular defensive strategy failed: the search for a white knight. In the second
week of January, rumors emerged that the French conglomerate Vivendi might
become a partner in the takeover defense. Mannesmann surprisingly announced
that Vivendi was its strongest partner and shared the same strategic vision. Amid
merger rumors, Mannesmann announced it was developing plans for a merger of
its core businesses with the telecommunications division of Vivendi. At the same
time, Esser announced that a merger with Vodafone was being considered if
Mannesmann shares made up a clear majority in the new company, with 58.5
percent being given as a realistic figure. Chris Gent offered Mannesmann share-
holders only a 48.9 percent share of the new company. By the end of January, Vo-
dafone entered into negotiations with Vivendi and sought to win them as a pos-
sible buyer of Orange following the takeover battle. The fronts shifted, as Vivendi
announced a joint Internet portal with Vodafone if the takeover succeeded. The
white knight strategy had failed.
On February 3, 2000, an agreement was announced between Vodafone and Man-
nesmann. Klaus Esser accepted an improved bid giving Vodafone a 50.5 percent
and Mannesmann a 49.5 percent share in the merged company. In addition, the
agreement made a number of promises regarding the continuation of the inte-
grated telecommunications strategy at Mannesmann, and all fixed-line network
and Internet activities were to be moved to Düsseldorf. Assurances were given
that Mannesmann subsidiaries Arcor and Infostrada would not be sold and that
the IPO of the engineering and automotive businesses would proceed as planned
in Summer 2000 without the divisions being broken up and sold as subunits. The
Supervisory Board approved the plan on February 4 with the consent of the labor
representatives. Klaus Zwickel (IG-Metall) expressed his satisfaction with the
agreement: “The employee representatives on the Supervisory Board accept the
merger on this basis.” The merger agreement largely laid to rest fears of large-
scale dismissals, despite the fact that no formal guarantee was made. Sharehold-
ers had gained some 100 million euros, constituting a 120 percent rise in the share
price between mid-October 1999 and February 3, 2000. Thus shareholders were
able to realize short-term gains through the takeover battle as a result of the in-
creased percentage given to Mannesmann shareholders in the share swap.
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The main motivation for the capitulation of Mannesmann management appears
to have been the failed alliance with Vivendi. On February 7, Klaus Esser was
quoted as saying that “until Vivendi entered its alliance with Vodafone, we had a
clear advantage in the loyalty of the shareholders. After this announcement, we
began a series of calls to the largest investors. After that, it became clear that Vo-
dafone would receive at least 45 percent.” The agreement between Vodafone and
Vivendi over a common Internet strategy rebuffed some of Esser’s strategic ar-
guments that Vodafone was blind to the Internet. An open question remains
whether the Supervisory Board continued to support Esser even after the failed
negotiations with Vivendi or whether it pushed management toward accepting a
friendly deal with Vodafone. Past takeovers such as Continental and Thyssen
show that the Supervisory Boards of the target companies often make great ef-
forts toward achieving a friendly merger. However, no definitive answer can yet
be given in the case of Mannesmann. Following Vodafone’s second offer, news-
papers increasingly reported rumors that Esser was having difficulties in main-
taining the support of the Board, although Esser denied these claims. Speculation
remained that Supervisory Board members Jürgen Schrempp (DaimlerChrysler)
and Henning Schulte-Noelle (Allianz) had pushed for a friendly merger. How-
ever, a labor representative of the Supervisory Board denied any notable differ-
ences of opinion. In such intense media battles, strategic misinformation can also
be an important tactic to influence public opinion: Rolf Breuer (Deutsche Bank)
was reported to support the takeover bid, but was in fact not even a member of
the Supervisory Board.
4.8 Post-merger Reorganization
The months following February 2000 were characterized by intense discussion
over the modalities of reorganizing Mannesmann (see Figure 4). However, the
reorganization is fraught with conflicts. First, the planned listing of Atecs (the
automotive and engineering divisions) did not go ahead, despite opposition from
Klaus Esser and Joachim Funk. Atecs has some 90,000 employees, accounting for
70 percent of Mannesmann employees and some 53 percent of turnover. Voda-
fone’s demand for cash led to the quick sale of Atecs to the highest bidder, going
to Bosch and Siemens for 9.75 billion euros in April 2000. Many accused Chris
Gent of breaking his promise that Atecs would become independent. Bosch and
Siemens pledged that no redundancies would be made before the end of 2003.
However, Atecs’ various businesses are being further split up, and subsidiaries
outside Siemens’ core areas sold. A growing number of white-collar employees in
management have sought other jobs, and only some 170 of 440 remain. Second,
Salzgitter AG bought the tube production facilities from Mannesmann. Histori-
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cally the core business of Mannesmann, this division suffered large losses in re-
cent years and was sold for the symbolic price of DM 1. Finally, the secondary
business of luxury watches was also sold in July 2000.
Vodafone also restructured the telecommunications businesses in line with its
past strategy of mobile networks. As expected, the European Commission ap-
proved the merger on the condition that Orange be sold, going to France Telecom
for 48 billion euros in May 2000. The high price paid represented a profit of 9 bil-
lion euros from the purchase and resale of Orange over a period of a few months.
Contrary to the assurances given by Chris Gent about an integrated strategy, the
Italian fixed-line network company Infostrada was sold to Enel Spa and its sub-
sidiary Wind for some 11 billion euros. Mannesmann Arcor now remains isolated
as the last fixed-line network business, despite its strength as the main competitor
of Deutsche Telekom. Given the distrust that exists toward the British parent,
employee morale remains particularly low at this division, and a growing num-
ber of employees are being lured away by competing firms. The planned IPO of
Arcor has been delayed due to new demands from its minority shareholder,
Deutsche Bahn AG.
In retrospect, the takeover allowed Vodafone to further its focused strategy on
mobile communications by gaining control over two strategically key businesses,
Mannesmann Mobilfunk/D2 and Italian Omnitel. This strategy is highly favored
by analysts, wary of falling prices for fixed-line communications. Whereas the
integrated strategy pursued by Mannesmann was designed to compete with the
integrated telecommunications monopolies such as Deutsche Telekom, these
firms are splitting their holdings into separate businesses. While the takeover was
Figure 4 Core Participations of Mannesmann, 1999
Telecommunications
Mannesmann Mobilfunk/D2
Mannesmann Arcor (stationary)
Omnitel (Italy, mobile)
Infostrada (Italy, stationary)
Orange (UK, mobile)
Turnover 1999: 9.0 billion euros
Employees: 28,400
Tubes
Turnover 1999: 2.0 billion euros
Employees: 12,500
Luxury Watches
Mannesmann
Atecs
(Machine Tools/Automotive)
Mannesmann Rexroth
Mannesmann Dematic
Mannesmann Demag Krauss-Maffei
Mannesmann VDO
Mannesmann Sachs
Turnover 1999: 12.3 billion euros
Employees: 89,800
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paid for by a share swap alone, Vodafone demanded cash as it sold Mannes-
mann’s other divisions and created a gold mine of liquidity for refinancing. Vo-
dafone now has the most UMTS licenses in Europe and lower debt than major
competitors, and its share price has suffered less from the downturn in the tele-
communications industry, sinking some 40 percent rather than the sector average
of 60 percent. The brand name “Mannesmann” is being replaced by Vodafone.
The final shareholders’ meeting of the independent company of Mannesmann
took place in June 2000. A total of 98.71 percent of share capital was present: 98.6
percent held by Vodafone and the remaining 0.11 percent by small shareholders,
of which some 300 individuals were present. The remaining shareholders sharply
criticized both the management and new owners. Shareholder activists Hort
Steinharter and Jörg Pluta accuse Esser of ripping off shareholders by not seri-
ously negotiating with Vodafone and by spending large amounts on takeover de-
fense against the interests of shareholders. They also criticized Esser for having
received not only the DM 28 million specified in his contract, but an extra DM 31
million “achievement award” upon departure at the initiative of large share-
holder Hutchison Whampoa (Slodczyk 2000; Manager Magazin 3/01, 156). This
award prompted an investigation into Klaus Esser on corruption changes by the
Düsseldorf court. Although the court initially dismissed a suit brought by two
German lawyers, the court opened an investigation in March 2001 on the suspi-
cion that Esser and other members of Mannesmann management had been
promised financial rewards for consenting to the takeover.22
The new management structure at Mannesmann reduced the Board to just three
members: Julian Horn-Smith (Vodafone), Thomas Geitner (formerly of the Ger-
man company RWE and OtelO), and Albert Weismüller (Mannesmann). Five
members of the past Management Board left over the next few months. Weis-
müller had been planned as an internal appointment before the takeover, sched-
uled for February 2000. This new Management Board structure sparked conflicts
with the labor representatives of the Supervisory Board. Past labor director Sig-
mar Sattler left Mannesmann, but remained labor director of Atecs AG. Unex-
pectedly, Vodafone rejected the idea that employees should approve the ap-
pointment of a labor director to the Management Board, the traditional procedure
at Mannesmann. As a result, labor representatives boycotted the shareholders’
meeting and abstained from voting during the appointment of Julian Horn-Smith
as spokesman of the Mannesmann Management Board. The issue also created
great uncertainty about the role of Mannesmann within the new company, e.g.,
whether Düsseldorf would retain strategic competence in coordinating the Euro-
pean strategy. Klaus Zwickel (IG Metall, Mannesmann Supervisory Board) said
that “we won’t take it lying down.” On July 12, 2000, the Supervisory Board gave
                                                  
22 This investigation remains open at the time of writing.
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Alfred Weismüller additional functions as labor director, alongside his functions
as finance officer. The Supervisory Board itself was also changed: four share-
holder representatives (including ex-manager Joachim Funk) left, and three Vo-
dafone Board members and one prominent German corporate lawyer were ap-
pointed. Meanwhile, three Mannesmann Supervisory Board members became
non-executive directors of Vodafone: Josef Ackermann (Deutsche Bank), Jürgen
Schrempp (DaimlerChrysler), and Henning Schulte-Noelle (Allianz).
5 Conclusion: Hostile Takeovers and the Institutional Change
in German Corporate Governance
It was demonstrated above that the institutional barriers to hostile takeovers
(Section 3.1) proved to be absent or insufficient in practice to protect Mannes-
mann in the hostile takeover battle with Vodafone. Is Mannesmann an excep-
tional case or a paradigmatic event that points to major underlying changes in
German corporate governance? This paper argues that since the late 1990s, the in-
stitutional context for large listed German companies has changed sufficiently to
make hostile takeovers a real threat. A limited but growing number of German
corporations are exposed to a market for corporate control. The concluding sec-
tion will review the role of various institutional barriers in the Mannesmann case
and examine the degree to which similar parameters apply to other German cor-
porations.
5.1 Mannesmann in Context
The vulnerability of Mannesmann primarily stemmed from its lack of a commit-
ted ownership structure: Its shares were highly fragmented among institutional
and foreign investors typically holding less than 1 percent of the share capital.
Mannesmann had a somewhat exceptional ownership structure for a German
company, but is not an isolated case. With regard to ownership distribution
among the largest 100 corporations, 75 percent of company shares are widely
held in 11 companies, and the majority of shares are widely held in 23. Thus a key
segment of the German corporate economy is similarly exposed. Ownership
fragmentation will likely accelerate, given the strategic reorientation of German
banks toward investment banking and as a result of the tax policy to eliminate
capital gains tax for the sale of intercorporate shares in 2002. Where ownership is
fragmented enough to leave corporations vulnerable to hostile bids, the other in-
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stitutional factors that discourage takeovers are no longer enough to mobilize ef-
fective resistance.
Whereas German banks once played a major governance role, banks are increas-
ingly unlikely to provide takeover protection. At Mannesmann, bank ties were
not particularly strong. Despite the fact that there was a Deutsche Bank director
on the Supervisory Board and a high level of proxy voting by banks, none of the
German banks held a major equity stake. No known attempt was made to mobi-
lize the influence of banks. More generally, German banks have begun a major
reorientation toward investment banking, where the business of advising M&A
deals stands in conflict with past relationship banking. The major private banks,
Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, and Commerzbank, have all made substantial
moves in this direction. Consequently, the number of Supervisory Board seats in
the largest 100 companies held by banks declined from 29 in 1996 to just 17 in
1998. In its corporate governance guidelines of March 2001, Deutsche Bank an-
nounced that it will no longer hold the chair on the boards of non-financial corpo-
rations (Deutsche Bank 2001). Likewise, banks have reduced the size of their larg-
est ownership stakes and diversified their investments (Böhm 1992).
Codetermination also failed to have its expected deterrent effect. Mannesmann
employees made little effort to mobilize resistance against the legitimacy of the
bid. What was the reason for this weak opposition? The fear of job losses may
have been relatively low, since Mannesmann is part of the booming telecommu-
nications sector and the split with older industrial divisions was already planned.
Thus employees may have had varied interests, and the most direct impact was
expected in the telecommunications divisions that had lower rates of union or-
ganization. More generally, German labor unions may have also become resigned
to the inevitability of takeovers.23 During the watershed case in 1997, IG Metall
was unsuccessful in uniting both the Thyssen and Krupp workforces in opposi-
tion to the bid. Here, employee interests as producers outweighed their common
class interests in opposing the merger.24 Consequently, Mannesmann labor repre-
sentatives focused efforts on securing a favorable post-merger business plan. In
this context, post-takeover restructuring shows that labor was ineffective in en-
forcing several major promises made by Vodafone: the Atecs division did not be-
come independent, the integrated telecommunications strategy was abandoned,
the Düsseldorf headquarters lost its strategic importance, and the name Mannes-
                                                  
23 The union position in the debate over German takeover law is also revealing (Deutscher
Gewerkschaftsbund 2000). Whereas the industry associations favor a wider range of
defensive tactics for target firms, the unions support a more restrictive version, in-
cluding Supervisory Board codetermination of defensive action taken by management.
24 On the distinction between the class and producer interests of employees, see Streeck
(1993).
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mann was dropped in favor of Vodafone D2.25 It is obviously difficult to predict
whether such a “breach of trust” will have learning effects for German labor, ei-
ther in increasing future resistance to takeover bids or in obtaining binding con-
cessions from predator firms. However, the cases of Mannesmann and Thyssen-
Krupp show that mergers involve complex questions of industrial strategy in
which organized labor strongly considers its company-specific producer interests,
often at the expense of its wider class interests.
In the absence of active resistance from stakeholders, the various regulatory fac-
tors discussed earlier (accounting rules, corporate law, competition law, and
other defensive actions) were insufficient to ward off a hostile bid or to construct
an adequate defense. German accounting rules did not discourage the takeover
bid. In addition, past caps on voting rights in the Mannesmann corporate statutes
were voided by the Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich
(Act on Control and Transparency in the Corporate Domain, KontraG), passed in
1998, and went into effect mid-2000. However, Mannesmann did invoke other
features of German company law during its takeover defense, particularly the
need for a super-majority to gain effective control and carry out the sale of Or-
ange. While the issue loomed large for a short period during the battle, this factor
alone was also insufficient protection. Competition law was also a consideration
because of Orange. However, the very strong M&A market in European tele-
communications left little doubt that Orange could quickly be sold at a high price,
thus failing to act as a decisive factor. Given the lack of institutional protection,
the main defensive action taken by Mannesmann management was the search for
a white knight. White knight strategies are always uncertain, and the failure to
secure an agreement with Vivendi certainly sealed the outcome of the takeover
battle.
Finally, Mannesmann also exemplifies the substantial moves already made to-
ward a corporate culture of “shareholder value.” The spin-off of traditional busi-
nesses was already planned before the takeover and was no longer an issue in the
takeover battle. Although the two competing management teams did propose
substantially different corporate strategies, both alternatives were within a simi-
lar spectrum circumscribed by the capital market.
As the institutional barriers to takeovers weaken, German corporations with dis-
persed ownership will increasingly face the threat of takeover. This claim is inde-
pendent of the other economic factors that drive M&A. In the Mannesmann case,
M&A was rife within the booming telecommunications sector, and the bubble in
technology stocks at the time of the merger made Vodafone shares extremely at-
                                                  
25 However, some post-merger policies of Vodafone were also supported by factions of
the union IG Metall (although not the works council), in particular the sale of Atecs.
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tractive. However, the telecommunications sector is not exceptional in either re-
gard. During the late 1990s, cross-border takeovers in Europe were more or
equally prevalent in the banking industry, utilities, electronics, and chemicals.
Moreover, the hostile takeovers in the United States during the 1980s were tar-
geted at conglomerates in low-growth industries. British and U.S. firms also have
consistently higher valuations relative to German companies in the same sector,
thus reproducing their relative advantages in takeover contests nationally. Hos-
tile bids will thus remain a persistent threat despite the cyclical nature of M&A.
5.2 Political Regulation of Takeovers
The direct impact of the Mannesmann case was the renewed discussion over the
urgency of a binding takeover law in Germany. The law should not only protect
the interests of shareholders, but also create clear procedures for the bidding pro-
cess. In March 2000, the Chancellor’s Office set up an expert commission to make
recommendations.26 The Ministry of Finance then presented a draft law in June
2000 and a revised draft in March 2001 (Bundesministerium der Finanzen 2000;
2001). Both drafts restrict defensive actions taken by management by requiring
the Management Board27 to be “neutral” and to refrain from issuing shares, un-
dertaking share buy-backs, or engaging in measures that have a significant im-
pact on company balance sheets. White knights would thus be the only active de-
fense permitted. This clause was praised by various shareholder associations, but
was criticized by German corporations and unions. The opposition stalled the
quick passage of a law.
At the same time, surprising developments occurred at the European level.28 In
June 2001, a special mediation committee reached agreement on a draft takeover
directive for submission to the European Parliament. Among its liberal provi-
sions, this compromise draft included the controversial requirement of manage-
                                                  
26 The controversial recommendations made by the expert commission included man-
datory tender offers at a level of 30 percent, no requirement for cash payment, and
the neutrality of the Management Board with regard to defensive measures
(Bundespresseamt 2000).
27 This notion of neutrality is much more restrictive than prohibitions on “frustrating
actions” in the British code, which prevent management from taking actions that in-
tentionally destroy value and go against the interests of the company.
28 The EU has been unsuccessful in developing a takeover directive since the initial
draft in 1989. The main points of debate were: the control threshold for requiring
tender offers, requirements for cash payments to slow takeover activity, time limits
for the acceptance of a tender offer, information rights for employees, and the scope
for defensive tactics that management is allowed.
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ment neutrality. The dramatic vote by the European Parliament was 273 in favor,
273 against, and 22 abstentions. The directive thus failed to be passed, because the
President Nicola Fontaine abstained. Germany was sharply criticized in the press,
being viewed as responsible for the failure after having withdrawn its support in
the last few days before the vote. In particular, Volkswagen chairman Ferdinand
Piëch, BASF finance officer Max Dietrich Clay, and union leader Hubertus
Schmoldt (IG-BCE) were cited as having had an influential political lobby for
more protective regulation. Their two main arguments both pointed to German
firms being put at a disadvantage in takeover contests: U.S. managers are allowed
much more freedom to implement takeover defenses and, unlike Germany, other
European countries retain “golden shares” that give the state power to block
takeover attempts. The result was greeted by both the Federation of German In-
dustries and the German Banking Association.
Subsequently, the German Government moved quickly to present another re-
vised takeover law scheduled for a vote in the Bundestag in Fall 2001 (Bundes-
ministerium der Finanzen 2001). While drawing largely on the previous draft
law, the neutrality rule has been replaced by the option for defensive actions with
shareholder approval. Specifically, the shareholders’ meeting can empower man-
agement to take defensive actions for an 18-month period with a 75 percent ma-
jority vote. The law also requires the Management Board to publish the stance of
the works council on takeover bids as part of the official response. The content of
the final law remains open at the time of writing. However, given its present
form, the law is unlikely to create major barriers to takeovers or to radically ac-
celerate the market for corporate control as the original European proposal may
have done.
5.3 Institutional Change and the German “Model”
of Corporate Governance
The main conclusion of this paper is that, given the erosion of previous institu-
tional barriers to hostile takeovers and unlikely political prospects for strong re-
strictions, Mannesmann will not remain an isolated incident in Germany. What
implications does the emergence of a market for corporate control have for the in-
stitutional change in German corporate governance? The various “institutional”
schools of thought view institutions as the social and political rules for economic
action, leading to different norms and incentives for actors and shaping their
identities over time. Markets for corporate control are qualitatively different from
individual markets for products, capital, and labor, and this fourth market is a
qualitatively new institution in which entire organizations combining the other
factors of production are bought and sold (Windolf 1994). Takeover markets cre-
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ate new incentives and constraints for organizations and alter the interests of
major actors and the distributional compromises embedded within previous cor-
porate governance coalitions. The emergence of a market for corporate control,
even on a limited scale, demonstrates that Germany can no longer be described
without qualification as having a bank-oriented, insider, or stakeholder model of
corporate governance. While true international convergence remains far off,
Germany is developing a novel “hybrid” model of governance characterized by
the institutionalized participation of labor within an increasingly open capital
market (Streeck 2000; Vitols 2000; Jackson 2002).
Three implications may be drawn from the case of Mannesmann as to the con-
tours of an emerging hybrid: First, takeovers are likely to have distributive ef-
fects. Whereas labor normally captures a high share of the value-added, markets
for corporate control make the “equilibrium” of lower market capitalization and
lower distribution of value-added for shareholders increasingly difficult to sus-
tain (Section 2.2). A growing number of corporations report concern about hostile
bids and are attempting to strengthen share prices and engage in preventive
M&A that increase their own size relative to international competitors. Together
with the expanding “supply side” for equity capital and higher stock price valua-
tions, markets for corporate control will thus reinforce broader efforts to imple-
ment corporate practices oriented toward shareholder value. Consequently,
widely held German corporations are increasingly divesting diversified business
(Zugehör 2001). Moreover, German corporations with highly dispersed owner-
ship pay out significantly higher shares of value-added as dividends, and those
implementing shareholder value programs have a smaller labor share due to re-
ductions in overall employment (Beyer/Hassel 2001). Mannesmann was already
moving down a path of changing its corporate culture or the “conception of con-
trol” (Fligstein 1990). The capacity to buy and sell entire companies as marketable
commodities is closely linked with a tendency by management to view organiza-
tional units in terms of their financial contribution to increasing corporate value
on the stock market.
Second, markets for corporate control further the functional change of codetermi-
nation as an institution. Codetermination historically emerged as a political com-
ponent of economic democracy aimed at putting capital and labor on a more
equal footing (Jackson 2001). The market for corporate control forces employee
representatives to increasingly internalize the reactions of international capital
markets to company policy. While codetermination as a legal institution remains
unchanged, employee representation increasingly adopts functions of co-
management in serving the competitive interests of corporations. Takeovers fall
outside the realm of codetermination and upset the existing set of implicit con-
tracts between stakeholders. While the Supervisory Board of Mannesmann ac-
Jackson, Höpner: An Emerging Market for Corporate Control? 49
cepted the bid on the basis of promises about maintaining an integrated tele-
communications strategy, the strategic plans and the independence of business
units were dramatically changed as a result of the transfer of ownership, and la-
bor had little capacity to enforce promises made at the time of the takeover.
Third, markets for corporate control create new opportunities for corporate man-
agers to exercise power and may make relatively little contribution toward im-
proving managerial efficiency. According to leading theories, markets for corpo-
rate control are a mechanism for correcting “managerial failure” and pose an ef-
fective solution to the agency problems of dispersed shareholders having little
means of controlling management. Mannesmann shows that takeovers are also
about the exercise of power and that “good” companies can also lose. Takeover
markets provide a new means for pursuing strategic interests by eliminating
competitors and gaining control of strategic resources. Vodafone was able to
strengthen its own position and capture the rewards of restructuring and spin-
offs. While takeover markets may be an inevitable development in Germany and
may improve short-term returns for shareholders, takeovers are only a very im-
perfect substitute for mechanisms of internal control that increase accountability
and enable long-term investment in building organizational capacities.
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